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ment in section 702 of the Utilities Code, supm, that the 
utility must do everything necessary to secure compliance 
with the law and rules by its agents and officers is nothing 
more than an additional precautionary measure to prompt 
the utilities with regard to compliance by those persons. It 
does not mean that it may evade the duty by the independent 
contractor device or limit the scope of its duties thereby. 
It does not negate the existence of a nondelegable duty. The 
case of Hard v. Hollywood 'l'~Lrf Club, 112 Cal.App.2d 263 
[246 P.2d 716], while containing some dictum concerning the 
delegability of duties, holds that the Labor Code provisions 
requiring a safe place to work for employees did not apply 
to an independent contractor where a subcontractor's em-
ployees were concerned because the word ''employer,'' as 
used in the Labor Code, was interpreted to include only the 
one who had employees and not contractors. 'l'hus it is readily 
distinguishable from the case at bar for here there is no doubt 
that the duty was imposed on the defendant. 
Defendant contends that the rules set forth in Eli v. 
1Y11Lrphy, supra, 39 Cal.2d 598, and Knell v. Morris, supra, 
39 Cal.2d 450, as well as other authorities heretofore cited 
are not in point because they involved either the duty im-
posed on a landlord to comply with certain laws with respect 
to permanent conditions on the leased property where no 
activity by a contractor was involved or that the activity of 
defendant utility here involved was merely incidental and 
not a part of the business authorized by its franchise, the 
production, transmission and sale of electricit:\', and that such 
incidental duties are delegable. If by incidental action of 
the independent contractor it is meant that the activity in 
question is not necessarily part of the duty imposed, we do 
not have such a situation here where the duty to install the 
poles in a certain manner was squarely imposed. [7] The 
construction and maintenance of lines, which includes poles, 
is a necessary part of the utility's business. It needs them to 
transmit electricity, the commodity in which it deals. The 
duty imposed expressly includes the placing of poles and 
states that their placement involves the safety of both the 
workmen and public, indicating that unless they are properly 
installed "considerable risk" or danger will exist. ·whether 
we speak of the existence of a nondelegable duty as arising 
from defendant's franchise to do business or a special duty 
imposed by statute or rule or as a common law principle is 
not important as indicated by the above discussion. [8] If a 
July 1955] SNYDER v. SouTHERN CAL. EmsoN Co. 803 
l44 C.2d 793; 285 P.2d 9121 
common law principle is involved, defendant, as the possessor 
of laud, is answerable for the negligent failure of ·wilson 
the independent contractor to put or maintain structures, the 
pole, in reasonably safe condition. (Knell v. ~Morris, supra, 
89 Cal.2d 450, 456.) 
The cases relied on by defendant are not controlling. In 
Neuber v Royal Realty Co., 86 Cal.App.2d 596 [195 P.2d 
601], v. 59 Cal.App.2d 402 [138 P.2d 733], 
Binger v. Eastern Columbia, Inc., 72 Cal.App.2d 402 [164 
P.2d 531], and Runyon v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.App. 
383 [180 P. 837], the court was concerned with the question 
of the duty of a landlord with respect to the condition of 
the premises, liability for the lessee's activity or the land-
lord's dnty to repair. Donahoo v. Kress li 01tse Moving Corp., 
25 Ca1.2d 237 [153 P.2d 349], merely involved the liability 
of an independent contractor to the tenant of a honse he 
was moving for the landlord and which was occupied by the 
tenant. Houghton v. Lorna Prieta Lbr. Co., 152 Cal. 500 
[ fl3 P. 82, 14 Ann.Cas. 1159, 14 lJ.R.A.N.S. 913], involved 
the liability of the owner of land in an uninhabited arra 
for blasting done thereon for him by an independent con-
tractor and it was held the owner was not liable for the con-
tractor's negligence. The court seems to imply that there 
must be a nuisance or absolute liability before a nondelegable 
duty exists, bnt this is contrary to the later cases. The same 
comment applies to Louthan v. Hewes, 138 Cal. 116 [70 P. 
1065]. Barrabee v. Crescenta M.ut. Water Co., 88 Cal.App. 
2d 192 [198 P.2d 5581, held the independent contractor in-
sulated the owner from liability because no duty was imposed 
on the owner and no peril was inherent in the work. That 
i:-; not true here. Moreover, the case is of doubtful authority 
in view of the authorities heretofore cited, especially the case 
of Knell v. Morris, s?tpra, 39 Cal.2c1. 450. 
Another point is made by plaintiffs. They claim that 
inasmuch as under section 702 of the Public Utilities Code, 
snpra, defendant is required to "do everything necessary and 
proper" to secure compliance with the statutes and rules of 
the commission by its ''employees'' it should have been left 
to the jury to determine whether defendant did everything 
necessary and proper to secure eompliance by its employees, 
such as its inspector, as distinguished from its independent 
eontractor. It will be recalled that there is evidence that 
defrndant 's inspector did not inspect the installation of the 
pole in question and that it was not customary for him to 

